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We provide game-theoreticfoundations for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional
bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics.
We prove that, as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be
passed in any subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter’s ideal point.
While we leave the possibility of some delay, we prove that the agents’ equilibrium con-
tinuation payoﬀs converge to the utility from the median, so that delay, if it occurs, is
inconsequential. We do not impose stationarity or any other reﬁnements. Our result
counters intuition based on the folk theorem for repeated games, and it contrasts with
the known result for the distributive bargaining model that, as agents become patient,
any division of the dollar can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
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Numerous applications in political science and political economy rely on the implications of
single-peaked preferences in one-dimensional environments. First noted by Hotelling (1929)
and Downs (1957), the median voter theorem dictates that the median of the distribution
of voter ideal points bears the preference of a majority of voters to every other alternative.
The median, in other words, is the unique element of the core of the majority voting
game. This was formalized by Black (1958) and Arrow (1963), who proved that, when the
number of voters is odd, the majority preference relation is transitive, with the core point
being the unique maximal element of the majority ranking. The median voter theorem has
facilitated numerous applications by oﬀering concrete predictions in models of committees
and elections, indeed, doing so without the prerequisite of deﬁning a non-cooperative game
form to describe the strategic calculations of individual decision-makers.
While an advantage in maximizing the ﬂexibility of applied models, the absence of a non-
cooperative underpinning of the median voter theorem is a disadvantage in another respect:
without a ﬁrm game-theoretic foundation, we cannot be sure that the predictions of the
median voter theorem are consistent with the incentives of strategically sophisticated agents.
More precisely, we do not know what kinds of restrictions on individual preferences and
institutional procedures will lead to equilibrium outcomes at or near the median voter’s ideal
point. Indeed, the folk theorem for repeated games suggests that when individuals weight
the future heavily,1 many diﬀerent outcomes may be supported as equilibrium outcomes in
addition to the median, casting doubt on the status of the median. Such results are known
to hold in a wider class of stochastic games (Dutta, 1995) and in the distributive bargaining
model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). In the framework of a one-dimensional bargaining
model, however, we show that these doubts are needless: as the agents of our model become
very patient, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes collapses to the median.
We analyze committee decision-making using a non-cooperative inﬁnite-horizon bar-
gaining model based on a random recognition rule and majority voting: in any period, an
agent is randomly selected and proposes an alternative in a one-dimensional policy space,
which is then subject to a majority vote; if the proposal passes, then the proposed policy is
implemented, and the game ends; and if the proposal fails, then play moves to the next pe-
riod, where this procedure is repeated. Agents’ preferences over alternatives are represented
by arbitrary strictly concave (and therefore single-peaked) utility functions. We prove two
results. First, as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can pass
after any history in any pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium converges to the median
voter’s ideal point. We do not impose any equilibrium reﬁnements, and in particular we
do not impose stationarity. Second, while we do not preclude the possibility of delay in
equilibrium as the agents become patient, delay becomes negligible: the set of payoﬀs for
an agent after any history in any pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium converges to
the utility from the median. Thus, we provide strong support for the predictions of the
median voter theorem.
Most work on majority-rule bargaining has focused on stationary subgame perfect equi-
1See Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for details on the folk theorem for repeated games.
1libria in distributive settings. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) solve for the unique symmetric
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and ﬁnd that in equilibrium, a proposer oﬀers some
of the good to the “cheapest” majority possible and oﬀers zero to the remaining agents. Har-
rington (1989,1990a,b) examines the eﬀects of risk aversion in this setting. More recently,
Eraslan (2002) drops the restriction of symmetry and establishes that the Baron-Ferejohn
equilibrium is unique among all stationary equilibria. Eraslan and Merlo (2002) show that
this conclusion does not hold generally if the amount of money to be divided varies stochas-
tically over time.
Banks and Duggan (2000) investigate the connections between stationary equilibrium
outcomes and the majority core in a spatial setting. They prove existence of a pure strategy
stationary equilibrium and show that, as agents become patient, the set of proposals that can
be passed in any stationary equilibrium collapses to the core point. Moreover, unless some
agents are perfectly patient, stationary equilibria exhibiting delay do not exist. Whereas
the authors assume a “bad status quo” in that paper, Banks and Duggan (2005) assume a
common discount factor and allow for the status quo to be an arbitrary element of the policy
space. They prove existence and that, again, stationary equilibrium outcomes collapse to
the core as agents become arbitrarily patient. Delay can occur, but only if the status quo
is the unique core point, and then that alternative is the only proposal that can possibly
pass. Thus, delay, if it occurs, cannot aﬀect the alternative realized in any period. Our
results generalize the core convergence found in these papers by dropping the reﬁnement of
stationarity. Non-stationary equilibria may exhibit delay, even when the status quo is not
at the core, but we show that the payoﬀs of the agents, when patient enough, will not be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by delay.
By virtue of their simplicity, stationary equilibria may possess a focal eﬀect, lending some
justiﬁcation to stationarity as a reﬁnement of subgame perfect equilibrium.2 Of course, their
relative tractability also makes them a natural ﬁrst object of study. But the logic of Nash
equilibrium alone does not preclude the possibility of other, non-stationary subgame perfect
equilibria, in which agents adopt history-dependent strategies. This would seem a problem
especially in long-standing institutions, where norms dictating non-stationary behavior may
arise over time. Indeed, assuming at least three agents, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) prove
that every allocation of private good can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome as bargainers in the distributive model become very patient. Our results show
that this folk theorem result does not carry over to the one-dimensional bargaining model,
and in fact the opposite occurs: as agents become very patient, the set of subgame perfect
equilibrium outcomes converges to the unique core point.
In deriving our characterization result, we are able to substantially generalize the frame-
work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks and Duggan (2000, 2003). First, we allow for
both models of the status quo that have been considered, i.e., the status quo may be gener-
ally bad for the agents (as when no policy is currently in place) or may itself be an element
of the set of alternatives. Second, whereas the probability that a particular agent is selected
as proposer is ﬁxed in the standard framework, we allow these recognition probabilities to
vary with histories quite arbitrarily. Thus, for example, the probability that one agent is
2See Baron and Kalai (1993) for a formalization of these ideas.
2selected in period t + 1 can depend on the proposal in period t and on the identities of the
agents who voted to reject that proposal. We require only that each agent’s recognition
probability has a positive lower bound. This excludes models in which proposers are chosen
in a pre-determined order, but it allows us to approximate such deterministic models to an
arbitrary degree.
Third, we modify the basic model by stipulating that voting is sequential, with each
agent’s vote observed by all later agents. Because the stationarity reﬁnement essentially
reduces the voting stage to a binary vote (the proposal vs. continuation play following
rejection), the voting stage is usually treated as a simultaneous vote in the majority-rule
bargaining literature. This gives the agents unique “stage-undominated” voting strategies,
and it is assumed that the agents vote accordingly. Stationary equilibrium outcomes are
unchanged if voting is sequential, regardless of the order of voting, and the additional
dominance reﬁnement is then unnecessary. Thus, when stationarity is assumed, the two
approaches to modelling voting are equivalent. When stationarity is dropped, however,
continuation equilibria may punish or reward particular agents for their votes, and stage-
dominance loses its bite in the simultaneous voting game. It therefore becomes necessary to
model voting as sequential.3 As with recognition probabilities, we allow the order of voting
to be stochastic and to vary with histories quite arbitrarily. We allow the distribution over
voting orders to vary with the history, including the current proposal; and we allow for
uncertainty regarding the voting order even after a proposal is made. It is suﬃcient for our
arguments to impose the weak restriction that the probability of each voting order has a
positive lower bound.
Last, unlike some work on bargaining with majority-rule voting, we allow for heteroge-
neous time preferences among the agents. Speciﬁcally, our main result holds for sequences of
discount factors for the agents that converge to one and satisfy a “convergence condition,”
which formalizes the idea that one agent’s discount factor not converge much more quickly
than any other’s. Thus, the asymptotic core equivalence result of Banks and Duggan (2005),
which assumes a common discount factor, extends to the heterogeneous case.
Our paper is related to the literature on inﬁnite-horizon bargaining models initiated by
Rubinstein (1982), who considers an alternating-oﬀer protocol for two agents, and Binmore
(1987), who assumes the proposer is randomly drawn in each period. In this work, an
alternative is an allocation of a private good (“pie”) to the agents, and a proposer must
obtain the assent of the other agent, so proposals are essentially subject to a unanimity
voting rule. These authors establish general uniqueness results, independent of the agents’
discount factors, using arguments that exploit the structure of two agents and unanimity rule
and which are quite diﬀerent from ours: we address the possibility of multiple agents, which
increases the dimensionality of the space of continuation payoﬀs (and the scope for selective
punishments and rewards of agents) and increases the complexity of voting behavior; the
role of the majority core is central in our argument, in contrast to the case of unanimity
rule; and our uniqueness result takes an asymptotic form.4
3It is well-known that, without the aid of reﬁnements, simultaneous voting under majority rule can lead
to perverse Nash equilibria, exploiting the possibility that no one agent is “pivotal.”
4Cho and Duggan (2003) show by example that when agents are imperfectly patient, there may exist
multiple stationary equilibria in the one-dimensional model with majority rule. Thus, a general uniqueness
3The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section
3, we state our main result and give an overview of the proof. Section 4 contains the formal
proof of our theorem. In Section 5, we discuss more of the related literature. In Section 6,
we give a concluding discussion. Proofs of lemmas are contained in an appendix.
2 The Model
We develop the model in a series of steps.
1. Bargaining protocol
Let N = {1,...,n} denote a set of n ≥ 2 agents who play an inﬁnite-horizon bargaining
game over a set X of alternatives. Assume X ⊆ R is nonempty, compact, and convex, i.e.,
X is a nonempty, closed, bounded interval. In any period prior to the choice of an alter-
native, an agent is randomly selected and proposes an alternative, which is then voted on
sequentially; if the proposal passes, then the proposed policy is implemented, and the game
ends; and if the proposal fails, then play moves to the next period, where this procedure is
repeated.
Because we model voting as sequential with the voting order determined stochastically,
and because we seek to maximize the generality of our model with respect to the information
of the proposer, we assume that the order of voting is determined by two “voting states,”
one realized before the proposer moves and the other realized after a proposal is made. This
allows us to capture settings in which the proposer has full, partial, or no information about
the order in which his/her proposal will be voted on. At this point, we take distributions
over proposers and voting states as given, and we explain later how these distributions may
vary with histories.
Thus, in any period t = 1,2,... prior to the choice of an alternative, we model bargaining
as follows: (1) an agent i is selected by nature to propose an alternative; (2) a “step 1”
voting state, denoted s1, is selected by nature from a ﬁnite set S1 and observed by all
agents; (3) agent i makes a proposal, say x, which is observed by all agents; (4) a “step
2” voting state, denoted s2, is selected by nature from a ﬁnite set S2 and observed by all
agents; and (5) a sequential vote is held in some order φ( |s1,s2):N → N, where the ﬁrst
voter φ(1|s1,s2) casts a vote vφ(1|s1,s2) ∈ {a,r} to accept or reject the proposal. This is
observed by all agents, then φ(2|s1,s2) casts a vote, and so on. The outcome of voting is
determined by a ﬁxed collection D ⊆ 2N \ {∅} of decisive coalitions. If the set of voters
voting for the proposal is decisive, i.e., {j ∈ N|vj = a} ∈ D, then the proposal is chosen and
bargaining ends with outcome (x,t). Otherwise, the above procedure (1)–(5) is repeated in
period t + 1.
We assume that a status quo q, which may or may not be an element of X, is in
place until an alternative is chosen. Let X+ = X ∪ {q}. We endow each agent i with a
result is not available.
4utility function ui:X+ → R, which we use later to deﬁne the payoﬀs of the agents. We let
u:X+ → Rn denote the vector-valued utility function deﬁned by u(x) = (u1(x),...,un(x))
for all x ∈ X+. It is assumed that, for all i ∈ N, the restriction of ui to X is continuous
and strictly concave. Then it is maximized by a unique point, denoted ˜ xi, the ideal point
of the agent. Let agent k satisfy









That is, the agents with ideal points to the right of k’s do not make up a majority, and
k is the “leftmost” agent possessing this property. When the number n of agents is odd,
as it is in many applications, k is simply the well-known median voter. When the number
of agents is even, the distribution of agents’ ideal points may admit two medians, and we
select k arbitrarily as the owner of the “lefthand” median ideal point.
We assume that voting is by majority rule, with a minor modiﬁcation in case n is even.




   





When n is even, there arises the possibility that the voters are evenly divided between
accepting and rejecting a proposal. In this case, we give agent k the power to break ties by
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and k ∈ C
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That is, we assume voting is by majority rule, with a tie-breaking vote held by the median
voter. An implication of our assumptions is that regardless of the number of agents, D is
nonempty, proper (C ∈ D implies N\C / ∈ D), and strong (C / ∈ D implies N\C ∈ D).
2. Histories
A history is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequence of actions of agents and nature. A complete
history is either the initial history, ∅, or any history ending with n votes of the agents. A
proposer history for i is any history in which agent i and any step 1 voting state have just
been selected by nature, and so i must next propose an alternative; a step 2 history is any
history in which a selected agent has just made a proposal, and so a step 2 voting state
must be selected by nature; and a voting history for i is any history in which it is i’s turn
to vote. Technically, we let Hc
t denote the set of t-period complete histories, H
pi
t the set of
t-period proposer histories for i, H
s2
t the set of t-period step 2 histories, and Hvi
t the set of
t-period voting histories for i. We specify Hc









































Then the sets of proposer histories for i, of step 2 histories, of voter histories for i, and of

























[Hpi ∪ Hs2 ∪ Hvi ∪ Hc]
denote the set of all ﬁnite histories, and deﬁne the mapping τ:H → {0,1,...} by τ(h) = t
giving the length, in terms of periods, of any ﬁnite history h ∈ Ht.
Thus, at any history h ∈ Hpi, agent i is the active player at h, and i’s action set is
Ai(h) = X; at h ∈ Hs2, nature, denoted n+1, is the active player at h, and nature’s action
set is An+1(h) = S2; at h ∈ Hvi, agent i is the active player at h, and i’s action set is
Ai(h) = {a,r}; and at h ∈ Hc, nature is the active player at h, and nature’s action set
is An+1(h) = N × S1. Let A = X ∪ S2 ∪ {a,r} ∪ N × S1 denote the action space of the
bargaining game. Deﬁne the mapping ι:H → N ∪{n+1} such that, for each ﬁnite history,
ι(h) is the active player at h.
Deﬁne binary relations < and ≪ on H as follows. For any h,h′ ∈ H, we say h′ imme-
diately follows h, written as h < h′, if h′ ∈ {h} × Aι(h)(h). That is, h < h′ if h′ is equal
to h with the addition of an action by the active player h. We say h′ follows h, written as
h ≪ h′, if there exist histories h1,...,hT ∈ Hc such that h < h1 <     < hT = h′. Thus, ≪
is the transitive closure of <, and h ≪ h′ holds if and only if h is an initial segment of h′.
Let H•(x) denote the set of complete histories in which x has been proposed and accepted






   
   
   
 
 
there exists h ∈ Hc such that
h′ = (h,i,s1,x,s2,vϕ(1),...,vϕ(n)),
ϕ = φ(s1,s2), and





and let H• =
 
x∈X H•(x) denote the set of all terminal histories. Deﬁne the mapping
χ:H• → X by χ(h) = x for any terminal history h ∈ H•(x), and let H◦ = Hc \ H• denote
the set of all non-terminal, complete histories.
Let H∞ be the set consisting of every inﬁnite history, which is an inﬁnite sequence in
{∅} ∪ N ∪ S1 ∪ X ∪ S2 ∪ {a,r} such that every initial segment is a non-terminal history.
Of course, every complete truncation of an inﬁnite history must end in the rejection of the
proposed alternative, so that any history in H∞ is characterized by inﬁnite delay. Given
h ∈ H and h′ ∈ H∞, write h ≪ h′ if h is an initial segment of h′. Finally, let H = H•∪H∞
be the set of histories fully describing a play of the bargaining game.
63. Payoﬀs and the core






i )ui(q) + δ
τ(h)−1
i ui(χ(h)) if h ∈ H•,
ui(q) if h ∈ H∞,
for all h ∈ H, where δ = (δ1,...,δn) is the vector of discount factors with δi ∈ (0,1) for all
i ∈ N. We interpret these payoﬀs as generated by a ﬂow, where the agent receives the status
quo payoﬀ in every period that a proposal is rejected; and once a proposal is accepted, the
agent thereafter receives the utility from that chosen alternative, all payoﬀs discounted over
time.
We maintain either of two assumptions on the agents’ status quo utility:
(A1) q ∈ X,
(A2) for all i ∈ N, ui(˜ xk) > ui(q).
The former assumption formalizes the idea that the status quo utility is generated by an
alternative, in place until some other alternative is chosen, and the latter formalizes the
idea that delay is unanimously bad for the agents relative to the core point. This is weaker
than the universal assumption in distributive models that the status quo utility is zero and
therefore less than or equal to the utility from every alternative.
The core, denoted K, consists of the alternatives that are weakly preferred to all others





   
 
for all y ∈ X and all C ∈ D, there
exists i ∈ C such that ui(x) ≥ ui(y)
 
.
That K is nonempty follows because D is proper, X is one-dimensional, and agents’ pref-
erences are “single-peaked.” Since D is also strong, K is actually a singleton and consists
of the ideal point ˜ xk of agent k, deﬁned above. Deﬁning
CK = {i ∈ N | ˜ xi = ˜ xk}
CL = {i ∈ N | ˜ xi < ˜ xk}
CR = {i ∈ N | ˜ xk < ˜ xi},
we have CK ∪ CL ∈ D and CK ∪ CR ∈ D. Note that CK includes agent k and may include
other agents as well, since we do not assume the agents’ ideal points are distinct.
74. Strategies and moves by nature
At any proposer history for i, the agent observes the history and has action set X,
the set of possible proposals. At any voter history for i, the agent observes the history
and has action set {a,r}. Thus, a pure strategy for i is a pair of mappings, pi:Hpi → X
and vi:Hvi → {a,r}, where pi(h) describes what i would propose if selected as proposer
after history h, and vi(h) describes i’s vote after h. An alternative representation that will
be useful is a probability measure σi( |h) that is degenerate on pi(h) for all h ∈ Hpi and
degenerate on vi(h) for all h ∈ Hvi. A pure strategy proﬁle is then denoted σ = (σ1,...,σn).
The selection of a proposer and step 1 voting state after any complete history h is
stochastic and given by the probability distribution ρ( |h) on N ×S1, which can depend on
the history quite arbitrarily. The determination of the voting order is also random, and,
to maximize generality, we allow the voting order to be determined in two steps: a pair
(s1,s2) of voting states uniquely determines a voting order φ( |s1,s2), where the mapping
φ:S1 × S2 → NN takes values in the set of permutations on N. The distribution over
S2, and therefore the distribution of voting orders, may depend quite arbitrarily on the
preceding complete history, the selected proposer, the step 1 voting state, and the current
proposal. We let π( |h,i,s1,x) denote this distribution on S2, and we let Φk ⊆ NN be the
set of voting orders in which k votes ﬁrst, i.e., ϕ ∈ Φk of and only if ϕ(1) = k.
Our only restriction on the determination of the proposer and voting order is the fol-
lowing:




ρ(i,s1|h)π(s2|h,i,s1, ˜ xk) > 0. (1)
That is, for each agent and each order of voting with k moving ﬁrst, the probability that
the agent is selected as proposer and that, conditional on proposing the core point ˜ xk, the
voting order is realized is bounded strictly above zero. An implication is that each agent’s
probability of proposing is bounded strictly above zero as we vary over proposer histories.
Thus, we do not capture sequential proposal models, where the agents “take turns” making
proposals, but we can approximate them arbitrarily closely. Note also that the condition
only restricts the order of voting following a proposal of the speciﬁc alternative ˜ xk. A
simple and much stronger condition suﬃcient for our restriction is that the distributions
over proposers and voting states are history-independent, with each agent having a positive
probability of being selected and each voting order realized with positive probability.
It will be useful to introduce notation for nature’s strategy that is consistent with our
notation for agents’ strategies: let σn+1( |h) be a probability measure such that σn+1( |h) =
ρ( |h) for all h ∈ Hc, and let σn+1( |h) = π( |h) for all h ∈ Hs2.
5. Distributions over histories and expected payoﬀs
Beginning at any ﬁnite history h ∈ H, a strategy proﬁle σ determines a transition
probability for histories following h. Speciﬁcally, consider h,h′ ∈ H with h ≪ h′, say






if h′ follows h; deﬁne ζσ(h|h) = 1; and deﬁne ζσ(h′|h) = 0 if h′ does not follow h and
h′  = h. This can be extended to a probability distribution on histories H in the obvious
way: for every h′ following h, the probability of the cylinder set with initial segment h′, i.e.,
{h′′ ∈ H | h′ ≪ h′′}, is just ζσ(h′|h). As is standard, this probability measure has a unique
extension from the ring of such cylinder sets to the σ-algebra generated by them, and this
extension is denoted ζσ( |h).5

















where we make use of the fact that, because of our focus on pure strategies, the support of
ζσ( |h) on H• is countable. Here, of course, 1−ζσ(H•|h) is the probability of inﬁnite delay.
6. Continuation lotteries
A lottery is a Borel probability measure on X+,6 and we endow the space of lotteries,





which gives i’s expected utility from the lottery λ on X+.
It will be useful to rewrite expected payoﬀs from a strategy proﬁle as expected utilities
from a lottery in Λ, which we call a continuation lottery. The continuation lottery for i at h
given σ, denoted λσ
i (h|δ), is the discrete probability distribution on X+ deﬁned as follows:












5When considering the probability of a singleton, say {h
′}, we just write the argument of ζ
σ(·|h) as h
′.
6Here, we give X
+ the topology in which open sets are of the form X ∩ G or (X ∩ G) ∪ {q}, where G is
open in R. Since X is compact, X






















It may be that under (A2), the status quo q does not belong to X, in which case we adopt
the convention that H•(q) = ∅. Note that, insofar as the discount factors of the agents may
diﬀer, the continuation lottery λσ
i (h|δ) may vary with i.
Lemma 1 Let σ be an arbitrary strategy proﬁle. Then
Uσ
i (h|δ) = (1 − δ
τ(h)−1




for all h ∈ H and all i ∈ N.
Thus, an agent i’s expected payoﬀ at h given σ is in fact a positive aﬃne transformation
of i’s expected utility from the continuation lottery at h given σ.
7. Subgame perfect equilibrium
As is standard, we deﬁne a strategy proﬁle σ as a subgame perfect equilibrium if, for
every agent i ∈ N, every strategy σ′
i for i, and every history h ∈ Hpi∪Hvi at which i is the
active player, deviating to σ′
i does not increase i’s expected payoﬀ:
Uσ




where σ−i = (σ1,...,σi−1,σi+1,...,σn) is the strategy proﬁle σ less i’s strategy. In other
words, after every history for i, the player weakly prefers the continuation lottery given σ
to the alternative lottery given (σ′
i,σ−i):
Vi(λσ




Let Σ(δ) denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategy proﬁles. For each h ∈ H◦,
deﬁne
Xσ(h|δ) = {x ∈ X | there exists h′ ∈ H•(x) such that ζσ(h′|h) > 0}
as the set consisting of all proposals that pass with positive probability following h in










10as the set of all proposals that pass following any history in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Finally, deﬁne the set
V (δ) = {(V1(λσ
1(h|δ)),... ,Vn(λσ
1(h|δ))) | σ ∈ Σ(δ),h ∈ H◦}
of payoﬀ vectors that may arise after any history from any subgame perfect equilibrium.
8. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
A subgame perfect equilibrium σ is stationary if each agent’s proposal strategy is history-
independent and each agent’s voting strategy depends only on the current proposal: for all
i,j,j′ ∈ N, all h,h′ ∈ Hc, all x ∈ X, all s1,s′
1 ∈ S1, all s2,s′
2 ∈ S2, all C,C′ ⊆ N \ {i}, and
vC ∈ {a,r}C, and all vC′
∈ {a,r}C′
, it must be that




Such equilibria are relatively easy to play and this may confer a focal eﬀect, lending support
for the stationarity reﬁnement.
Allowing for a multidimensional space of alternatives and a general voting rule, Banks
and Duggan (2000) prove existence of stationary equilibria when recognition probabilities
are history-independent, i.e., for all h,h′ ∈ Hc and all i ∈ N, ρ(i|h) = ρ(i|h′), under a
strengthening of (A2). Banks and Duggan (2005) replace the assumption of a bad sta-
tus quo with (A1) and assume a common discount factor, and they again prove existence
of stationary equilibrium with history-independent recognition probabilities. In the one-
dimensional model, under either set of assumptions, they show that there are no stationary
equilibria in (non-degenerate) mixed strategies. Cho and Duggan (2002) demonstrate that
there may be multiple (non-payoﬀ equivalent) stationary equilibria in one dimension. More-
over, such equilibria must be nested in the sense that the set of alternatives that would pass
if proposed in one equilibrium must be contained in the set that would pass in the other.
Banks and Duggan (2000, 2003) show that all stationary equilibrium proposals converge
to the core point in one dimension, providing a game-theoretic foundation for the median
voter theorem in terms of stationary equilibria.
Banks and Duggan (2000) show that delay cannot occur in stationary equilibria under
(A2), unless some agents are perfectly patient, i.e., δi = 1 for some i ∈ N. Banks and
Duggan (2005) prove that, under (A1), delay can occur only if the status quo alternative q
is in the core, i.e., ˜ xk = q here. In this case, all agents must propose the core alternative,
which may or not pass (the agent’s payoﬀs are unaﬀected) and the equilibrium is payoﬀ-
equivalent to the unique no-delay equilibrium in which ˜ xk passes. Thus, delay, if it occurs
in a stationary equilibrium, is inconsequential.
3 The Main Result
Our main result provides a strong game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem.
First, it shows that the proposals that may pass in any subgame in any subgame perfect
11equilibrium converge to the unique core point as the agents become patient. We consider a
sequence {δm} of vectors of discount factors satisfying the following convergence condition:











for all m. Equivalently, we require that the ratio of logged discount factors converge to one
for all agents, i.e., ln(δm
i )/ln(δm
j ) → 1 for all i,j ∈ N. Second, our result shows that the
payoﬀs in any subgame in any subgame perfect equilibrium converge to the utility of the
core point. An implication is that, unless q = ˜ xk, the probability of delay, measured by the




i (h|δm)(q) → 0.
In any case, the eﬀects of delay are insigniﬁcant when the agents are very patient.
In the formal statement of the theorem, when given a sequence {Y m} of subsets of some
Euclidean space and a point x, we write Y m → x if supy∈Y m ||y − x|| → 0.
Theorem 1 Assume either (A1) or (A2). Let {δm} be a sequence of vectors of discount
factors satisfying the convergence condition and such that X(δm)  = ∅ for suﬃciently large
m and δm
i → 1 for all i ∈ N. Then
(i) X(δm) → ˜ xk,
(ii) V (δm) → u(˜ xk).
In the remainder of this section, we provide an overview of the logic of the formal proof
of the theorem, given in the next section. The proof proceeds by supposing that X(δm) does
not converge to the core point and then deriving necessary conditions that must be satisﬁed
by the inﬁma and suprema of these sets. Let xm and xm denote the inﬁmum and supremum
of X(δm), and for convenience assume here that these bounds are achieved within the set.
Thus, for each m, there is some subgame perfect equilibrium and some history after which
xm is proposed and passed, and likewise for xm. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we
may assume that these bounds converge to x and x, respectively, and in this discussion we
focus on the typical case of interest, x < ˜ xk < x.
Because the collection D of decisive coalitions is strong, it is easy to show that, given
any m, either the set of agents who weakly prefer xm to xm is decisive or the set of agents
with the opposite weak preference is decisive. Passing to a subsequence again, we suppose
the former holds for all m. In the case we consider here, these bounds lie on either side of
the core point for large enough m, and then strict concavity implies that all agents with the
weak preference ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm) must strictly prefer ˜ xk to the bound xm. In fact, because
ui(˜ xk) > ui(x), this strict preference is preserved in the limit as well.
The rest of the analysis must confront the complexity of voting subgames, which, in
contrast to work that focuses on stationary equilibria, can no longer be treated as simple
12binary voting games. As an aside, we note that in binary sequential voting games of perfect
information, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome must be the majority-preferred of
two alternatives.7 An implication is that, if the core point ˜ xk is one of the alternatives being
voted on, then it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. It is straightforward
to construct binary voting examples in which, along the equilibrium path of play, some
agents vote for the winning alternative, despite the fact that it is worse than the other
(because changing their vote does not change the outcome). Another implication of the
above, however, is that, in equilibrium, every majority coalition must contain at least one
agent who weakly prefers the winning alternative to the remaining one.
In voting subgames of our model, though the outcome following acceptance of a proposal
is ﬁxed, the outcome following rejection is not: continuation equilibria can conceivably de-
pend on the votes of particular agents, creating the possibility of targeted punishments and
rewards of individual agents for their votes. Thus, there are potentially many continuation
lotteries following the rejection of any given proposal. While considerably more complex
than a binary sequential voting game, we establish in Lemma ?? that the second implica-
tion mentioned above extends to our model: in equilibrium, if a proposal passes after some
history, then every decisive coalition must contain at least one agent who weakly prefers
the proposed alternative (the outcome) to some continuation lottery following rejection.
Returning to the argument above, there must be some agent im with a weak preference for
xm over xm who weakly prefers xm to some continuation lottery. Passing to a subsequence,
we may select an agent i such that im = i for all m.
Since utility functions are strictly concave, agent i’s worst alternative in the interval
[xm,xm] is at an endpoint. Since ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm) by construction, it follows that xm is the
worst alternative for i that can possibly pass in any subgame. Thus, by the above, agent i
must weakly prefer this worst alternative to some continuation lottery – this is intuitively
implausible, as we would expect the continuation lottery to put positive probability on at
least one alternative better than xm, e.g., a proposal by i him/herself. By our restriction
in (??) on recognition probabilities, there is a positive probability that i will be selected as
proposer in that continuation; and if i proposes the core point ˜ xk, then every voting order
with k moving ﬁrst has probability bounded strictly above zero.
We arrive at a contradiction if we can show that when i proposes the core point, there
is some voting order with k moving ﬁrst for which this proposal passes. This would mean
that when xm is rejected, agent i is guaranteed a payoﬀ of at least ui(˜ xk) with a positive
probability (that does not go to zero) in every subsequent non-terminal history. Indeed, we
establish in Lemma ?? that a proposal of the core point will essentially pass when k votes
ﬁrst and voting alternates from either side of the core point ˜ xk thereafter; if it does not pass,
then the continuation value from proposing the core point approaches the utility of the core
point when agents are suﬃciently patient. Furthermore, we prove that ui(˜ xk) − ui(xm) is
positive for all m (and does not go to zero), and this produces our contradiction: agent i
can guarantee a continuation payoﬀ strictly greater than ui(xm) for large enough m.
To explain why the core point will pass if it is proposed and k votes ﬁrst, with voting
7Moreover, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the strategic form of the voting game
produces the same outcomes.
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Figure 1: Rejecting the Core Point
subsequently alternating on either side of the core point, we ﬁrst illustrate how the usual
logic for binary voting games fails unless the order of voting is restricted. For simplicity, we
assume a common discount factor for this discussion. Suppose that there are ﬁve agents,
j = 1,2,3,4,5, and that their ideal points are increasing in j. Thus, k = 3 and the core point
is ˜ x3. Suppose that the core alternative has been proposed, and that the order of voting is
3, 1, 2, 4, and 5. Assuming agent 3 has voted to accept the core point, the voting subgame
takes the form depicted in Figure 1, where we truncate the game form once acceptance or
rejection is determined.
Here, λ,λ′,λ′′ are continuation lotteries following rejection of the core point. As we
have discussed, these lotteries may be distinct, and we cannot rule out a priori the follow-
ing preferences for agents other than 3, where we only depict preferences needed for this
example.
1 2 4 5
λ′ λ′ λ λ′′
˜ x3 ˜ x3 ˜ x3 λ
λ λ′ ˜ xk
λ′′
14Then, as indicated in Figure 1, the unique equilibrium path of play is for agents 1, 2, and 4
to vote to reject the core point in favor of the continuation lottery λ′. Of course, agents 1
and 2 both prefer λ′ to the core point. Agent 4 strictly prefers ˜ x3 to the outcome of voting,
but that agent nevertheless votes to reject the core point because a vote to accept allows
agent 5 to obtain λ′′, which is even worse for agent 4. Thus, agent 4 is tempered by agent
5, who can be “bought oﬀ,” even if he/she also prefers ˜ x3 to λ′. Obviously, this disincentive
cannot be present in a binary vote, where λ′ and λ′′ are necessarily equal. This suggests
the possibility of subgame perfect equilibria in which the core point is rejected, even after
the ﬁrst agent votes to accept it.
The core point necessarily passes, in contrast, when the order of voting alternates.
Suppose the order of voting is 3, 1, 4, 2, and 5, and consider the voting decision for agent 2
after agent 3 and either 1 or 4 have voted to accept. By voting to accept ˜ x3, agent 2 obtains
the core point as the outcome, and therefore the agent votes to reject in equilibrium only if
doing so results in an outcome at least as good as the core point. In that case, agent 5 may
vote to accept, in which case the core point remains the outcome (so agent 2’s vote was
irrelevant); agent 5 will vote to reject in equilibrium only if doing so results in a continuation
lottery at least as good as the core point. But then agents 2 and 5 must each weakly prefer
that continuation lottery to the core point. Since u2 and u5 are strictly concave and the
agents’ ideal points are on opposite sides of ˜ x3, we conclude that the continuation lottery
must in fact be the point mass on the core point. Thus, the equilibrium outcome starting
from agent 2’s vote must indeed be the core point. Moving to agent 1’s vote, a similar
argument applies. We conclude that if agent 3 votes to accept initially, then the core point
will obtain, and since this is the agent’s ideal point, the proposal of ˜ x3 must pass.
The argument is more involved when we allow for heterogeneous discount factors, for
then two agents need not “see” the same continuation lottery. Under the convergence
condition, however, Lemma ?? establishes that the continuation lotteries of two agents
starting from any history must become close to each other as the agents become arbitrarily
patient. This allows us to establish in Lemma ?? that the continuation payoﬀs of the agents
when the core point is proposed converge to the utility of the core point.
The proof of the second part of the theorem hinges on showing that agent k’s contin-
uation payoﬀ converges to uk(˜ xk) in every subgame in every subgame perfect equilibrium,
which means that the corresponding continuation lotteries must converge to the point mass
on ˜ xk. And then Lemma ?? implies that the continuation payoﬀs of all agents must converge
to the utility of the core point.
4 The Proof
Let {δm} be as in the statement of Theorem ??. Before proceeding, we present some
preliminary technical results. The ﬁrst lemma gives a connection between the continuation
lotteries of the agents when discount factors converge to one at close to the same rate, as
stipulated in the convergence condition: we show that, if one agent’s continuation lottery
approaches some lottery, then so must the continuation lotteries of all agents. The result is
15uniform across all subgame perfect equilibria and all complete non-terminal histories.
Lemma 2 Let {(σm,hm)} be an arbitrary sequence such that σm ∈ Σ(δm) and hm ∈ H◦ for
all m. For all i,j ∈ N, if λσm
i (hm|δm) → λ in the weak* topology, then λσm
j (hm|δm) → λ
in the weak* topology.
Let Φ denote the set of permutations ϕ on N such that ϕ(1) = k and either
• for even j, ϕ(j) ∈ CK ∪ CL; and for odd j > 1, ϕ(j) ∈ CK ∪ CR, or
• for even j, ϕ(j) ∈ CK ∪ CR; and for odd j > 1, ϕ(j) ∈ CK ∪ CL.
That is, Φ is the set of voting orders in which the core voter votes ﬁrst, and subsequently
voters alternate from either side of the core.
We now use Lemma ?? to establish that the agents’ continuation payoﬀs approach their
utility from the core point whenever that alternative is proposed and the voting order lies
in Φ. Essentially, by proposing the core point, any agent can ensure that the core will pass
or, at least, that a lottery close to the pointmass on the core will result.




i (h,i,s1, ˜ xk,s2|δm)) − ui(˜ xk)| → 0.
Let xm = inf X(δm) and xm = supX(δm), which are ﬁnite since X is compact. To prove
(i), suppose X(δm)   ˜ xk, so that either xm   ˜ xk or xm   ˜ xk. Since D is strong, it follows
that, for each m, either {i ∈ N | ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm)} ∈ D or {i ∈ N | ui(xm) ≤ ui(xm)} ∈ D
because the union of the two sets is N. Without loss of generality, we take a subsequence
of {δm}, still indexed by m, such that
{i ∈ N | ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm)} ∈ D (2)
for all m. Since X is compact, we can go to a subsequence, still indexed by m, such that
xm → x for some x ∈ X. We claim x  = ˜ xk. To see this, suppose x = ˜ xk. Then, since X(δm)
does not converge to ˜ xk, we must have xm   ˜ xk. Since xm ≤ xm, there must then exist ǫ > 0
such that xm < ˜ xk − ǫ for inﬁnitely many m. For such m, since each ui is strictly concave,
we have ui(xm) < ui(˜ xk − ǫ) < ui(˜ xk) for all i ∈ CK ∪ CR. For these agents, continuity
implies ui(xm) < ui(xm) for inﬁnitely many m, but then {i ∈ N | ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm)} ⊆ CL
for such m, contradicting (??).
We claim that, for large enough m, there exists Cm ∈ D such that ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm)
and ui(˜ xk) > ui(x) for all i ∈ Cm. To see this, ﬁrst suppose x < ˜ xk, so xm < ˜ xk for large
enough m. Then we have xm = xm for large enough m: otherwise, by strict concavity,
{i ∈ N | ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm)} ⊆ CL / ∈ D, contradicting (??). Thus, setting Cm = CK ∪ CR ∈
D, fulﬁlls the claim. Second, suppose x > ˜ xk. Then, for large enough m, xm > ˜ xk. If
16˜ xk ≤ xm, then setting Cm = CK ∪ CL ∈ D fulﬁlls the claim. If xm < ˜ xk, then, by
strict concavity, ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm) implies ui(˜ xk) > ui(x) for m high enough. Setting
Cm = {i ∈ N | ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm)} fulﬁlls the claim.
The next lemma gives a necessary condition for a proposed alternative to pass in equi-
librium: every decisive coalition must contain at least one agent who weakly prefers that
alternative to some continuation lottery.
Lemma 4 For any m, let σm ∈ Σ(δm). If x ∈ Xσm
(δm), then for all C ∈ D, there exist
im ∈ C and hm ∈ H◦ such that uim(x) ≥ Vim(λσm
im (hm|δm)).
Since N is ﬁnite, we may take a subsequence, still indexed by m, for which there exists
C ⊆ N such that, for all m, C = Cm. Since xm = supX(δm), we can construct a sequence
xm in X so that xm ∈ [xm − 1
m,xm] ∩ X(δm). For each m, there exists σm ∈ Σ(δm) such
that xm ∈ Xσm
(δm). Since C ∈ D, Lemma ?? yields im ∈ C and hm ∈ H◦ such that
uim(xm) ≥ Vim(λσm
im (hm|δm)) for all m. Again since N is ﬁnite, we may take a subsequence,
still indexed by m, for which there exists i ∈ N such that, for all m, i = im. Let λm
i =
λσm
i (hm|δm) for each m, so we have
ui(xm) ≥ Vi(λm
i )
for all m. Since X+ is compact, {λm
i } has a weak* convergent subsequence, still indexed
by m, with limit, say, λ. Taking limits, we have
ui(x) ≥ Vi(λ), (3)
by continuity of ui. That is, agent i’s continuation value approaches the utility of the worst
possible alternative. We will show that this ultimately leads to a contradiction.





denote the smallest possible equilibrium continuation payoﬀ for agent j after any non-
terminal, complete history. Given any strategy proﬁle σ and any such history h, let ˆ σ
σ,h
j
denote the strategy for agent j that is identical to σj with the proviso that j proposes ˜ xk




















17be the smallest possible continuation payoﬀ for agent j when other agents use equilibrium
strategies and j proposes the core point. We have substituted σ for (ˆ σ
σ,h
j ,σ−j) in the last






denote the smallest possible equilibrium continuation payoﬀ for agent j after any history in
which some agent is selected to propose.
Since i ∈ C, we have ui(xm) ≥ ui(xm) and ui(˜ xk) > ui(x) for large enough m. Since ui
is concave, it follows that
min{ui(xm),ui(xm)} = min{ui(x) | x ∈ [xm,xm]},
and therefore that, for all x ∈ X(δm), ui(x) ≥ ui(xm). Then we have
Jm
i ≥ min{ui(xm),(1 − δm
i )ui(q) + δm
i Im
i }.
Suppose that (1 − δm
i )ui(q) + δm
i Im
i ≥ ui(xm) for inﬁnitely many m. Going to this subse-
quence, still indexed by m, we have
Vi(λm
i ) ≥ Im























ρ(i,s1|h)π(s2|h,i,s1, ˜ xk)ui(xm) + ρ(N \ {i}|h)ui(xm)
for all m, where the second inequality is implied by subgame perfection and the last in-
equality uses Jm
i ≥ ui(xm). Taking limits, applying Lemma ??, and using ui(˜ xk) ≥ ui(x),
this implies
Vi(λ) ≥  ui(˜ xk) + (1 −  )ui(x),
where by condition (??),   > 0. By construction, however, ui(˜ xk) > ui(x), which then
yields Vi(λ) > ui(x), contradicting (??).
Now suppose that ui(xm) ≥ (1−δm
i )ui(q)+δm
i Im
i for inﬁnitely many m. Going to such
a subsequence, still indexed by m, we have
Vi(λm
i ) ≥ Im























ρ(i,s1|h)π(s2|h,i,s1, ˜ xk)[(1 − δm
i )ui(q) + δm
i Im
i ]
+ρ(N \ {i}|h)[(1 − δm
i )ui(q) + δm
i Im
i ],




i . Taking limits, applying Lemma
??, and using ui(˜ xk) > ui(x) ≥ liminf Im
i , this implies
Vi(λ) ≥ liminf Im
i ≥  ui(˜ xk) + (1 −  )liminf Im
i .
Using   > 0, we conclude that
Vi(λ) ≥ liminf Im
i ≥ ui(˜ xk) > ui(x),
which again contradicts (??). This contradiction completes the proof of (i).
We have shown that xm → ˜ xk and xm → ˜ xk. To prove (ii), let {(σm,hm)} be an
arbitrary sequence such that σm ∈ Σ(δm) and hm ∈ H◦ for all m. Let λm = λσm
k (hm|δm)
for all m. Since X+ is compact, {λm} has a weak* convergent subsequence, still indexed
by m, with limit, say, λ. Let ˆ xm ∈ argmin{uk(x) | x ∈ [xm,xm]}, and note that ˆ xm → ˜ xk.
Using the notation from the proof of (i), replacing xm with ˆ xm, we have
Jm
k ≥ min{uk(ˆ xm),(1 − δm
k )uk(q) + δm
k Im
k }.
As in the proof of (i), if (1 − δm
k )uk(q) + δm
k Im
k ≥ uk(ˆ xm) for inﬁnitely many m, then we
have
Vk(λ) ≥  uk(˜ xk) + (1 −  )limuk(ˆ xm) = uk(˜ xk).
As in the proof of (i), if uk(ˆ xm) ≥ (1 − δm
k )uk(q) + δm
k Im
k for inﬁnitely many m, then we
have
Vk(λ) ≥ liminf Im
k ≥ uk(˜ xk).
We conclude that Vk(λ) ≥ uk(˜ xk).
Both under (A1) and under (A2), ˜ xk is agent k’s unique maximal point in X+. With
the above conclusion, this implies that λ is the pointmass on ˜ xk. Using Lemma ??, this
implies
Vj(λσm
j (hm|δm)) → Vj(λ) = uj(˜ xk)
for all j ∈ N, as required. Since our argument applies to all convergent subsequences of




j (hm|δm) − uj(˜ xk)| → 0,
which completes the proof.
195 Related Literature
Other examples of non-cooperative games with connections to the median voter theorem
can be found in the existing literature. It is well-known that, in an election with two
oﬃce-motivated candidates who can commit to their campaign platforms, the unique Nash
equilibrium is for both candidates to locate at the median voter’s ideal point.8 In general
environments, allowing for an arbitrary set of alternatives and arbitrary preferences, Bergin
and Duggan (1999) propose a simple game form to implement the core in subgame perfect
equilibrium. That game form involves simultaneous proposals by all agents, including a
time at which a proposal should be voted on; the earliest proposal is voted on ﬁrst, and if it
is rejected, a default alternative obtains. Thus, while perhaps lending some support to the
median voter theorem, their model does not fully capture the dynamics of many examples
of committee decision-making. Moldovanu and Winter (1995) provide a non-cooperative
foundation of the core of a general NTU game that is consistent with the one-dimensional
environment. They consider a model in which voting is sequential and the ﬁrst agent
to reject a proposal becomes the next proposer: they show that the payoﬀs from “order
independent” subgame perfect equilibria must lie in the core.9
Primo (2002) analyzes a multi-period (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) version of Romer and Rosenthal
(1978) model with a single proposer who does not vote and a single voter who does not
propose. He ﬁnds a general uniqueness result: for every value of discount factor less than
one, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Moreover, the unique outcome
of a multi-period model coincides that found by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) for the one-
period model. Thus, in Primo’s model, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
does not collapse to the core point (the ideal point of the single voter) as the discount
factor converges to one, demonstrating that our assumption of a positive lower bound
on recognition probabilities is essential for the asymptotic core equivalence result. In his
model, because the voter has no chance to propose in any continuation game, the proposer
can guarantee a continuation payoﬀ at least as high as the utility from the status quo for
every continuation game. Thus, patience of the voter does not alter equilibrium outcomes.
The asymptotic uniqueness results we ﬁnd are reminiscent of results for bargaining under
unanimity rule. Rubinstein (1982) analyzes a two-agent model, where, in contrast to the
models based on majority voting, the role of proposer alternates between the two agents. He
proves a strong uniqueness result: regardless of the discount factors of the agents, there is a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and delay does not occur in this equilibrium. Binmore
(1987) analyzes the two-agent model in which the proposer is determined randomly in
each period, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), and, in contrast to the results of the latter
authors, he obtains a general uniqueness result. Furthermore, as the agents become very
patient in these two-agent models, the subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs converge to the
Nash solutions. Merlo and Wilson (1995) assume random proposer selection and show that
there is a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium regardless of the discount factor,
8This characterization can be extended to mixed strategies (Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton, 2002) and
policy-motivated candidates (Duggan and Fey, 2003).
9A number of other papers also consider non-cooperative foundations of the core in TU games or in
economic environments.
20even if there are multiple agents and the amount of private good varies stochastically over
time. As shown by Shaked in a three-player example,10 however, general uniqueness does
not extend to more than two agents with deterministic proposer selection.
Our results contrast with the standard intuition drawn from the folk theorem for re-
peated games, and they suggest an “anti-folk theorem” for an important class of bargaining
games. As such, they are similar in spirit to the results of Lagunoﬀ and Matsui (1997), who
analyze a two-player pure coordination game of asynchronous timing. Those authors show
that, for a suﬃciently high common discount factor, the unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium outcome following any history is the payoﬀ-maximizing strategy pair. While there are
many technical diﬀerences between their model and ours, a feature common to both is that
the set of utility imputations achievable after any history is of lower dimension. In their
model, this is due to the assumption of pure coordination, so that the two players’ payoﬀ
functions are identical; in our model, it follows from our assumption of strictly concave
utilities deﬁned over a one-dimensional space. Thus, the ability to construct punishments
of deviating players is restricted, and the folk theorem of Dutta (1995) for stochastic games
does not apply.11
6 Conclusion
We provide strong game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem, showing that
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of a general bargaining game converge to the
median voter’s ideal point. Our analysis is complicated by several factors. First, our bar-
gaining game has a continuum of subgames, and strategies are potentially very complex.
Second, because we do not restrict the risk preferences of the agents (beyond risk aversion),
the element of randomness present in the process of proposer and voting order selection en-
tails that the space of possible continuation payoﬀ vectors is multidimensional, creating the
scope for targeted punishments and rewards. Third, we have modelled voting as sequential
and public, meaning that play following the rejection of a proposal may depend on how indi-
vidual agents voted. This, together with the multidimensionality of the space of the agents’
continuation payoﬀs, creates the possibility of equilibria using complex, history-dependent
strategies with outcomes far from the median.
Our analysis can be simpliﬁed if we assume that voting is not public, but rather by secret
ballot. Then continuation play cannot depend on individual votes, and we can return to
the reﬁnement of stage-undominated voting strategies. It is then straightforward to show
that the core point, if proposed, must pass with probability one, strengthening Lemma
??. And the arguments for Lemma ?? are much simpliﬁed. In seeking to obtain the
strongest possible foundation for the median voter theorem, we have conducted the analysis
is a framework that is unfavorable to the theorem, where the scope for using targeted
10See Sutton (1986) for an exposition of this example.
11Several other of Dutta’s (1995) assumptions are violated in our bargaining model: he analyzes a ﬁnite
state and action stochastic game, whereas our model requires a continuum of states and actions; he assumes
a common discount factor; because our game “ends” in some states, his asymptotic state independence
conditions are violated; and he uses for joint randomization, something we do not allow.
21incentives is substantial. Our results establish that, even if we allow continuation play to be
conditioned on precise historical details (such as how a particular agent voted), we achieve
the theorem as agents become patient.
We have considered only pure strategy equilibria, but this restriction has been largely
for convenience, as our arguments extend straightforwardly to allow for mixed proposal
strategies: mixing over proposals merely complicates the deﬁnition of continuation lotteries.
Mixing over votes leads to more diﬃculties, however, as the proof of Lemma ?? relies
on the ability of a certain agent, after a certain sequence of votes, to pass the proposed
alternative with probability one by voting to accept and to reject the proposed alternative
with probability one by voting reject.
Finally, we note that our results have implications for the debate in the political science
literature about the eﬀects of political parties. Krehbiel (1993) argues that parties, per se,
have no eﬀect on legislative behavior, and that regularities in voting often attributed to
party cohesion are simply driven by similarities in legislator preferences. Some authors, in-
cluding Calvert and Dietz (2005), Calvert and Fox (2003) and Jackson and Moselle (2002),
have explored the extent to which preferences can drive “party-like” behavior by examin-
ing equilibria of bargaining games. Our result informs this literature by establishing that,
when legislators are patient, party-like behavior cannot arise from equilibrium in the one-
dimensional bargaining model: all legislators propose essentially the same alternative (the
median), which essentially passes immediately. Therefore, explanations based on bargain-
ing equilibria must necessarily involve either some degree of impatience or multiple policy
dimensions.
A Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1 Let σ be an arbitrary strategy proﬁle. Then
Uσ
i (h|δ) = (1 − δ
τ(h)−1




for all h ∈ H and all i ∈ N.
Proof: Using the deﬁnition of λσ






















































1−δi, we can rewrite agent i’s expected





















Since the term δt−1
i ui(q) in (??) appears essentially once for every terminal history of length







ζσ({ˆ h ∈ H• | h′ ≪ ˆ h}|h)δt−1
i ui(q),







ζσ({ˆ h ∈ H∞|h′ ≪ ˆ h}|h)δt−1
i ui(q).







ζσ({ˆ h ∈ H | h′ ≪ ˆ h}|h)δt−1ui(q)













ζσ({ˆ h ∈ H | h′ ≪ ˆ h}|h)δt−1ui(q). (8)
Note that ζσ({ˆ h ∈ H | h′ ≪ ˆ h}|h) = 1 if h′ ≪ h. Thus, (??) reduces to (1 − δ
τ(h)−1
i )ui(q).
Also note that ζσ({ˆ h ∈ H | h′ ≪ ˆ h}|h) = ζσ(h′|h) for any non-terminal complete history h′















Thus, we arrive at
Uσ
i (h|δ) = (1 − δ
τ(h)−1














= (1 − δ
τ(h)−1





Lemma 2 Let {(σm,hm)} be an arbitrary sequence such that σm ∈ Σ(δm) and hm ∈ H◦ for
all m. For all i,j ∈ N, if λσm
i (hm|δm) → λ in the weak* topology, then λσm
j (hm|δm) → λ
in the weak* topology.
Proof: For each m, let δ
m
= max{δm
j | j ∈ N}, and let δm = min{δm






)α − (δm)α. (9)








Deﬁne rm by the equality (δ
m
)rm































By the convergence condition, rm → 1, which implies 1 − 1
rm → 0. Thus, the maximized
value in (??) goes to zero as m goes to inﬁnity.













24Letting b ≥ |f| denote a bound for f, note that
 















i (hm|δm)(x) − λσm
j (hm|δm)(x)]|
+|f(q)[λσm










   
 (δm
i )α(h′) − (δm
j )α(h′)
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i )α(h′) − (δm
j )α(h′)
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i )α(h′) − (δm
j )α(h′)
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i )α(h′)+1 − (δm
j )α(h′)+1
 





























where α(h′) = τ(h′) − τ(h). We have shown that this goes to zero, and we conclude that
λσm
j (hm|δm) → λ in the weak* topology.




i (h,i,s1, ˜ xk,s2|δm)) − ui(˜ xk)| → 0.
Proof: Take any sequence {(σm,hm)} such that σm ∈ Σ(δm) and hm ∈ H◦ for all m.
We ﬁrst prove the lemma for the n odd case, and we then modify the argument for the n
even case. Let ϕ = φ( |s1,s2), and assume without loss of generality that ϕ is the identity
mapping on N, and that k = 1, {2,4,... ,n−3,n−1} ⊆ CL∪CK, and {3,5,...,n−2,n} ⊆
CR ∪ CK. Let vℓ ∈ {a,r}ℓ denote a sequence of votes of length ℓ. We prove by induction
that the following compound hypothesis is true for all ℓ = 2,4,...,n − 1:
(H1) for all vℓ such that |{j ≤ ℓ | vℓ
j = a}| ≥ ℓ
2, it must be that
liminf Vℓ+1(λσm
ℓ+1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ|δm)) ≥ uℓ+1(˜ xk),
25(H2) for all vℓ−1 such that |{j < ℓ | vℓ−1
j = a}| ≥ ℓ
2, it must be that
Vj(λσm
j (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm)) → uj(˜ xk),
for all j ∈ N.
To prove the hypothesis for ℓ = n − 1, take any vn−1 such that |{j ≤ n − 1 | vn−1
j =
a}| ≥ n−1
2 . Since voting is by majority rule, we have (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−1,a) ∈ H•(˜ xk).
Letting σa
n be identical to σm
n with the proviso that σa
n(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm






1 , ˜ xk,sm







1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−1|δm)) = un(˜ xk).
By subgame perfection, it follows that
Vn(λσm
n (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−1|δm)) ≥ un(˜ xk)
for all m, establishing (H1).
Take any vn−2 such that |{j < n − 1 | vn−2
j = a}| ≥ n−1
2 . Since voting is by majority
rule, we have (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2,a,vn) ∈ H•(˜ xk) for each vn ∈ {a,r}. Letting σa
n−1 be
identical to σm
n−1 with the proviso that σa
n−1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm






1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2|δm)(˜ xk) = 1






1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2|δm)) = uj(˜ xk)
for all j ∈ N. If σm
n−1 = σa
n−1, then (H2) is fulﬁlled.
Suppose instead that σm
n−1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm




1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2|δm)) ≥ un−1(˜ xk).
By (H1), we have
liminf Vn(λσm
n (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2|δm)) ≥ un(˜ xk).
Since X+ is compact, {λσm
n−1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2|δm)} has a weak* convergent subse-
quence, still indexed by m, with limit, say, λ. By Lemma ??, we have λσm
j (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,
sm
2 ,vn−2|δm) → λ for all j ∈ N. By continuity, it follows that
Vn−1(λ) ≥ un−1(˜ xk) and Vn(λ) ≥ un(˜ xk). (10)
We next consider two possible cases.
26First, under (A1), condition (??) and concavity imply
un−1(Eλ) ≥ un−1(˜ xk) and un(Eλ) ≥ un(˜ xk),
where Eλ =
 
xλ(dx) is the mean of λ. Furthermore, since ˜ xn−1 ≤ ˜ xk ≤ ˜ xn, we conclude




1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2|δm)) → Vj(λ) = uj(˜ xk)
for all j ∈ N, as required. Second, under (A2), we claim that λ(q) = 0. Clearly, (A2)
and (??) preclude λ(q) = 1. The remaining possibility is λ(q) ∈ (0,1), in which case deﬁne
λ′ as λ′(Y ) =
λ(Y )
1−λ(q) for every Borel measurable set Y ⊆ R, and let Eλ′ =
 
xλ′(dx).
Since uj(q) < uj(˜ xk) for all j ∈ N, we have Vn−1(λ′) > un(˜ xk) and Vn(λ′) > un(˜ xk) by
(??). By concavity and ˜ xn−1 ≤ ˜ xk ≤ ˜ xn, however, this implies Eλ′ < ˜ xk and ˜ xk < Eλ′, a
contradiction. Thus, λ(q) = 0, and the argument of the previous paragraph carries over.
Since our argument applies to all subsequences of {λσm
n−1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 , vn−2|δm)}, we
have established (H2).
Suppose the hypothesis is true for ℓ + 2,...,n − 1. We claim that it is true for ℓ.
Take any vℓ such that |{j ≤ ℓ | vℓ
j = a}| ≥ ℓ
2. If agent ℓ + 1 votes to accept, then,
letting vℓ+1 = (vℓ,a), we have |{j < ℓ + 2 | vℓ+1
j = a}| ≥ ℓ
2 + 1, and so the antecedent
of (H2) holds for ℓ + 2. Therefore, letting σa
ℓ+1 be identical to σm
ℓ+1 with the proviso that
σa
ℓ+1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm






1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ|δm)) → uℓ+1(˜ xk). (11)
By subgame perfection, it follows that
Vℓ+1(λσm
ℓ+1(hm,i,sm







1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ|δm))
for all m. Taking limits and using (??), this implies (H1).
Take any vℓ−1 such that |{j < ℓ | vℓ−1
j = a}| ≥ ℓ
2. If agent ℓ votes to accept, then,
letting vℓ+1 = (vℓ−1,a,vℓ+1), we have |{j < ℓ+2 | vℓ+1
j = a}| ≥ ℓ
2 +1 for each vℓ+1 ∈ {a,r}.
Thus, the antecedent of (H2) holds for ℓ + 2. Therefore, letting σa
ℓ be identical to σm
ℓ with
the proviso that σa
ℓ(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm






1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm)) → uj(˜ xk) (12)
for all j ∈ N. If σa
ℓ = σm
ℓ , then (H2) is fulﬁlled.
Suppose instead that σm
ℓ (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1) = r. Subgame perfection implies
Vℓ(λσm
ℓ (hm,i,sm







1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm))
27for all m. With (??), this implies
liminf Vℓ(λσm
ℓ (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm)) ≥ uℓ(˜ xk).
By (H1), we have
liminf Vℓ+1(λσm
ℓ+1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ|δm)) ≥ uℓ+1(˜ xk).
Since X+ is compact, {λσm
ℓ (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm)} has a weak* convergent subsequence,
still indexed by m, with limit, say, λ. By Lemma ??, we have λσm
j (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vn−2,r|δm)
→ λ for all j ∈ N. By continuity, it follows that
Vℓ(λ) ≥ uℓ(˜ xk) and Vℓ+1(λ) ≥ uℓ+1(˜ xk). (13)
Then the argument for two possible cases, either (A1) or (A2), proceeds as above. Thus,
Vj(λσm
j (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm)) → uj(˜ xk)




2 ,vℓ−1|δm)}, we have established (H2).
We conclude that the induction statement is true for ℓ = 2. Letting σa
1 be identical to
σm
1 with the proviso that σa
1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm






1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 |δm)) → u1(˜ xk).
Subgame perfection then implies
liminf V1(λσm
1 (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 |δm)) ≥ u1(˜ xk).
Since X+ is compact, {λσm
1 (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 |δm)} has a weak* convergent subsequence, still
indexed by m, with limit, say, λ. By continuity, V1(λ) ≥ u1(˜ xk). Recall that k = 1, so ˜ xk is




1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 |δm)) → Vj(λ) = uj(˜ xk)
for all j ∈ N, as required. Under (A2), it follows that λ(q) = 0, and that λ is the point-
mass on ˜ xk, with a similar conclusion. Since our argument applies to all subsequences of
{λσm
1 (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 |δm)}, the n odd case is proved.
For the n even case, we assume that k = 1, {3,5,... ,n − 3,n − 1} ⊆ CL ∪ CK, and
{2,4,... ,n − 2,n} ⊆ CR ∪ CK. We prove that the following version of the induction
statement is true for all ℓ = 3,5,...,n − 1:
(H1) for all vℓ such that vℓ
1 = a and |{j ≤ ℓ | vℓ
j = a}| ≥ ℓ−1
2 , it must be that
liminf Vℓ+1(λσm
ℓ+1(hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ|δm)) ≥ uℓ+1(˜ xk),
(H2) for all vℓ−1 such that vℓ−1
1 = a and |{j < ℓ | vℓ−1
j = a}| ≥ ℓ−1
2 , it must be that
Vj(λσm
j (hm,i,sm
1 , ˜ xk,sm
2 ,vℓ−1|δm)) → uj(˜ xk),
for all j ∈ N.
28The argument is then as above, where now, when agents n and n − 1 vote to accept in the
ﬁrst step of the induction proof, at least half of the agents are in agreement; and because
agent k = 1 is among them, this coalition is decisive. Once the induction statement is
proved for ℓ = 3,5,...,n−1, we skip agent 2. Agent 1 can obtain a payoﬀ arbitrarily close
to u1(˜ xk), and the conclusion follows as above.
Lemma 4 For any m, let σm ∈ Σ(δm). If x ∈ Xσm
(δm), then for all C ∈ D, there exist
im ∈ C and hm ∈ H◦ such that uim(x) ≥ Vim(λσm
im (hm|δm)).
Proof: Suppose that σ = ((pi)i∈N,(vi)i∈N) ∈ Σ(δm), that x ∈ Xσ(δm), and take any
C ∈ D. Let ˜ hm ∈ H◦ and ˆ hm ∈ H•(x) satisfy ˜ hm < ˆ hm and ζσ(ˆ hm|˜ hm) > 0. That is, after
˜ hm, there is a positive probability that the agent selected proposes x, which then passes with
a positive probability. Thus, there exist i, s1, and s2 such that ρ(i,s1|˜ hm)π(s2|˜ hm,i,s1,x) >
0, pi(˜ hm,i,s1) = x, and ζσ(ˆ hm|˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2) > 0. Without loss of generality, suppose that
φ( |s1,s2) is the identity mapping on N, so that agent 1 votes ﬁrst, then agent 2, and so
on. Let v0
1 = v1(˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2), and let
v0
j = vj(˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2,v0
1,...,v0
j−1)
denote agent j’s vote along the equilibrium path starting from (˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2), for j =
2,...,n.
Let ℓ = |C|. Let h0 = (˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2,v0
1,...,v0
n). For any t = 1,...,ℓ, we recursively
deﬁne it and ht = (˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2,vt
1,...,vt
n) by changing the vote of each member of C, in
order, to reject and letting all other agents vote according to their equilibrium strategies,
until we generate a non-terminal history. More precisely, if ht−1 ∈ H•, then let it = min{j ∈
C | vt−1
j = a}. Note that this minimum is well-deﬁned since x passes at ht−1 and N\C / ∈ D,
implying that at least one member of C must accept x. And deﬁne ht by the following: for
all j with j < it, let vt
j = vt−1
j ; let vt
it = r; and, for all j with j > it, let
vt
j = vj(˜ hm,i,s1,x,s2,vt
1,...,vt
j−1).
If ht−1 ∈ H◦, then let it = it−1 and ht = ht−1.
Let hm = hℓ and im = iℓ. It is clear that hm ∈ H◦: otherwise, for all t = 1,...,ℓ, we
have ht ∈ H•, so by construction vℓ
j = r for all j ∈ C; this implies {j ∈ N | vℓ
j = a} ⊆ N \C
is not decisive, contradicting hℓ ∈ H•. By construction, agent im votes to accept after




Deﬁne the strategy σr
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